posted on: Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Gary Snyder


In the wake of the well-documented and well-publicized increase in corruption and malfeasance in numerous charities, too few are searching for tools to identify good governance, recognize poor management or dissuade dishonesty and fraud.

Many look to watchdog agencies to assist them in making thoughtful decisions regarding their donations by avoiding those charities with bad practices. However, some question if these agencies are misdirected and inconclusive in their efforts to address the current increase in private inurement and self-dealing in organizations with a one size fits all approach.

For-profit Sector

Prior to the economic meltdown, the public trusted credit-rating watchdogs to assist them in their investment choices. Services like Moody’s Investors betrayed their trust by giving triple-A grades to some of the cancerous derivatives and, as The New York Times stated, gave Countrywide Financial high grades. These gold seals of approval have encouraged the spending spree that left both investors with large losses and homeowners struggling with foreclosures. The imperceptible arms-length relationship between the watched and the watchdog led Moody’s profit margins to skyrocket, even surpassing Exxon’s. With no competition for the three big for-profit rating firms, the days ahead look even rosier.

Both for-profit and nonprofit watchdogs alike use proxy and unsubstantiated measures to evaluate the attributes of an organization. They are typically a reflection of the past and little forward-looking signs and structure. They seem so arbitrary.

One example serves to illustrate that point. Despite being under the sleepy eye of the for-profit watchdogs, The McKinsey Quarterly, in a study, suggested that investors paid a premium (about 18%) for good structural performance such as good governance. General Motors governance guidelines were the gold standard. Obviously they failed on a number of counts with the U.S. government unwilling to let the board fire its own CEO. Ultimately the government took-over the company and it was put into bankruptcy only to be saved by the U.S. taxpayers. So those investors with confidence in the watchdogs and their standards got hit twice.

All this, as Fortune Magazine noted, happened as the confidence in financial rating services crashed by 50%.

Charitable Sector

Several years prior to the economic implosion, there had been significant dwindling in charitable confidence. To put donor’s confidence in perspective we need only to look at a Brookings Institution study where only 11% of the public thought charities do a very good job of spending money wisely and only 19% feel that charities do a very good job of running their programs and services.

It is a generally accepted myth that the nonprofit rating services, such as Charity Navigator, BBB Wise Giving Alliance and American Institute of Philanthropy, are monitoring all nonprofits. The criterion that is used by watchdog groups is wanting. Because of different criteria, the rating agencies recommendations often conflict. One even sells its seal of approval on a sliding scale. Moreover, all fail to address in any substantive manner many of the issues that have gotten the nonprofit sector in trouble—scandals and inadequate governance.

Some ratings are anachronistic. For example, to sanction to automatic failure any group that has a certain number of years of expenses in reserves is preposterous. In these troubling times, who wouldn’t have wished that they had a huge amount of reserves? One could argue that not having any operating reserve may not suit all nonprofits and that could be lethal. That, for example, applies to 28 percent of the DC area charities, as the Washington Post cited. On the other hand, because the sector is so diverse, each organization needs to analyze its own cash flow and expenses and make decisions based on the strength of grants, the vicissitudes of fundraising, the potency of the economy and the revenue stream generated from all activities. To deny that the governing body is in the best position to make such a decision is shortsighted. Without sufficient funds (and that number is growing, I am confident), nonprofits will join the 16% failure rate of existing nonprofit groups in 2000 that either disappeared or became so small that they were no longer required to file tax returns by 2006, the Urban Institute study of DC area charities showed.

The quality of submissions to watchdogs is dubious. Charity evaluators, by their own admission, believe that the reporting from the nonprofits is often inconsistent, unclear and incorrect. Some point to large amounts of chicanery in the submissions they receive.

But is all of this bad and do these watchdogs perform a much-needed service? Some say that they raise the level of debate. Others challenge the simplistic checklists and metrics that may or may not be meaningful. Some have expressed concern that some may have crossed the line from being independent raters to becoming active consultants.

Let’s look at conventional believes that have become baked into generally-accepted good practice:

• Financial board expertise needed: we have seen some of the premier charities get caught in fraud even though they had very sophisticated board members with impressive financial skills. An example: In spite of board and Congressional monitoring, the Smithsonian had hair raising abuses including virtually unlimited travel and noncompetitive contracts, little oversight in salaries and housing allowances. On its Board of Regents: Chief Justice of U.S. Supreme Court; Vice President of U.S.; an executive of Microsoft; two university presidents; prominent builder; a venture capitalist; congresspersons.

• Frequency of board of directors meetings: Over the years watchdog agencies have changed the number of board meetings that will make boards more successful. There apparently is no optimal number of meetings that puts an agency in good stead. The most important intangible is effectiveness of the deliberations of the members. On Board of United Ways: The Central Carolinas United Way had some of brightest minds but the frequency of meetings did not preclude it from making the some glowingly embarrassing mistakes. They gave the executive of a mid-sized agency the highest salary and benefits package in the entire United Way system. They tried to keep it a secret. When the press got a hold of it, they fired her and are currently being sued by her. Embarrassed, 3 board members resigned, but the agency is still withholding pertinent documents from the public. This shortsightedness has been replicated in several United Ways including Atlanta, Capital Area, and New York with many affiliates with ongoing malfeasance.

• Attendance, size, more: It is unclear that attendance, codes of conducts, board size and minimum number of board members have reasonable impact, but some watchdog agencies think that these are important. Studies in the for-profit sector are inconclusive that board size means better decision-making. Diversity, seldom considered, may prove to be a more important matrix.

• CEO importance: There are mixed reviews as to the importance of having the charities CEO on the board. We have seen the Smithsonian with its CEO on the board and the CEO at American Red Cross and United Way not on the board having similarly poor results. There is no argument as to the importance of the CEO. However, The Urban Institute study finds that a CEO serving on the board means that the board is weaker and less engaged. The CEO, coupled with board chair, is the public face of the organization. A poor face, as in the case of the Smithsonian, ended with his humiliating firing. Several poor showings at the Red Cross ended with very public dismissals. The compromised face of several of those at local United Ways cost the agency dearly with diminished contributions. One thing is clear, there needs to be a demarcation between the roles of the board (as the ultimate authority) and the CEO (carries out the boards mandates).

Some believe that watchdogs in both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors are seemingly propagating meaningless guidance. This is particularly important since in many instances there is no better outcome by adhering to the standards than not. Furthermore, the costs associated with adhering to such fungible determinants can be immense in terms of time and money, particularly for small agencies.

The strengthening of the matrices that produce organization integrity may lie in some of the intangibles. Such human dynamics such as leadership character (both board and staff), organizational values, how decisions are made, open communications --- both at board meetings as well as between staff and board---conflict management and strategic thinking (both long and short) may promise to be the difference between a successful and a compromised agency.

Such skepticism has lead to an effort currently underway---The Social Investing Rating Tool. It will try to assess the way donors evaluate whether a charity is worth their money as well as whether organizations have favorable outcomes. Some believe that is a good endeavor, but others will reserve judgment until its completion. One problem is that it is made up of prominent philanthropists and entrepreneurs some of whom have questionable issues residing within their own organizations.

All want both sectors to do well. In the future, maybe we should calculate how the watchdogs measure objective data that support board members and staff dedication and diligence to do good governance. Maybe more importantly, they should gauge how agencies are doing with empirical evidence or determine whether their work is even making any difference.


Gary Snyder, the managing director of Nonprofit Imperative in West Bloomfield, Mich., is author of Nonprofits On the Brink and publisher of a monthly e-newsletter—Nonprofit Imperative, which focuses on the major issues affecting the philanthropic community. He can be reached at gary.r.snyder@gmail.com or at 248.324.3700.

posted on: Monday, June 29, 2009

By Yna C. Moore

Bernard Madoff received a 150-year sentence from a federal court in New York today. He was given the maximum sentence, but for many individuals and organizations that have lost an estimated of more than $13 billion to his Ponzi scheme, this brings little consolation.

Among Madoff’s victims were nearly 150 foundations, 105 of which lost between 30 to 100 percent of their assets to Madoff. What can other foundations learn from their mistakes and hopefully avoid being scammed by the next slick operator?

In today’s The Huffington Post, Aaron Dorfman summarizes the findings of Learning from Madoff: Lessons for Foundation Boards. He noted that more than 80 percent of those foundations that showed poor judgment by investing heavily on Madoff had four or fewer individuals serving on their boards. There was also a marked homogeneity among the trustees.

The results of the study puts into question the ability of these small, homogenous groups to make the best decisions for their organizations.

According to Aaron and the study, foundations need to have at least five trustees with a diversity of perspectives to serve on the board. In addition, trustees must implement and maintain conflict of interest and investment policies, and disclose demographic information of the institution’s board and staff.

Were you surprised about the findings regarding board size and diversity among the foundations victimized by Madoff? What do you think about the recommendation to have a minimum of at least five individuals serving on a foundation’s board?

Yna C. Moore is communications director at the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy.