



national committee for
responsive philanthropy

SERVING TIME...ON FOUNDATION BOARDS

May 2004

National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy

2001 S Street NW, Suite 620 • Washington, DC 20009

Phone 202.387.9177 • Fax 202.332.5084

E-mail: info@ncrp.org • Web: www.ncrp.org

About NCRP

The National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy is an independent nonprofit organization founded in 1976 by nonprofit leaders across the nation who recognized that traditional philanthropy was falling short of addressing critical public needs. NCRP's founders encouraged foundations to provide resources and opportunities to help equalize the uneven playing field that decades of economic inequality and pervasive discrimination had created. Today NCRP conducts research on and advocates for philanthropic policies and practices that are responsive to public needs.

For more information on NCRP or to join, please visit www.ncrp.org or call (202) 387- 9177.

Serving Time...on Foundation Boards

by John Barkhamer, Rick Cohen, and Jeff Krehely

Enron's Kenneth Lay has not gone to jail; in fact, he hasn't even been formally charged, although some of his former associates such as Andrew and Lea Fastow and Jeffrey Skilling will soon be learning the basics of prison argot. Nonetheless, not long after the Enron scandal first broke, it is difficult to think of too many foundations that would want Ken Lay on their board—except that an affiliate of the Heinz Family Trust kept Lay on its board—minus the Enron nametag—for several months.

In the wake of press coverage and now impending Senate Finance Committee hearings on corruption and malfeasance among some of the nation's private foundations—although, like Ken Lay, no one among these foundations has yet experienced a perp walk on the way to an arraignment—one might think that foundations would not want to be associated with corporate leaders whose questionable behaviors gave rise to the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation and now serve as the grist for weekly jury deliberations.

Decisions have been made by at least 15 private foundations to retain as board members individuals who have been accused or convicted of committing corporate fraud. These decisions are a clear demonstration that some in the sector do not see the need to disassociate themselves from paragons of corporate misgovernance. The decisions by these foundations—and utter lack of objections to these decisions by the sector's leadership—show that many in the sector are not up to the challenges of repairing the harm of today's foundation accountability.

This report provides a list of individuals who have been accused or convicted of committing some type of corporate fraud and who are still serving on foundation boards of directors. It also discusses recent federal legislation that is designed to clean up the scandals plaguing the nation's for-profit organizations, as well as New York State's proposed efforts to better regulate its foundation and nonprofit sectors. The report concludes with policy recommendations and options that will improve foundation governance and help restore the public's faith in institutional philanthropy.

We neither charge nor presume that these products of corporate scandals have adversely affected the grantmaking decisions of the foundations identified here. There is an abundance of good, solid executives and program staff at these foundations that possess ethical standards which these corporate wrongdoers demonstrably lack. But the message that organized philanthropy sends when permitting these people to serve as foundation trustees hardly helps when the sector is being scrutinized because of the “bad actors” that think that they are immune from public oversight.

Stewards the Public Might not Trust

The New York Times reported last year that the Ford Foundation decided to retain Paul Allaire on its board of directors after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had fined him for questionable financial reporting or accounting practices as the CEO of the Xerox Corporation and barred him from serving on the board of a publicly-traded company. This story raised the question of how many other individuals involved with the torrent of recent corporate scandals were still serving on foundation boards of directors.

To answer this question, a list of 80 recently alleged, confessed, and/or convicted corporate criminals was compiled, drawing from a range of publications, including CBS MarketWatch’s “Scandal Sheet,” The Corporate Library’s “Corporate Scandal Quick Sheet,” and SEC press releases from 2002 to present. Each name was then searched for in the Foundation Center’s Foundation Directory Online.¹ This search found the following, based on the Foundation Center’s data:

- Nine corporate reprobates serving on boards of personal/family foundations;
- Two corporate malefactors serving on boards of both personal/family and independent foundations; and
- Two corporate rogues serving on boards of independent foundations.

Table 1 provides information on these individuals, including the corporations and foundations with which they were/are affiliated, as well as the type of corporate scandal in which they were involved. Some of the individuals listed have become household names, such as Enron’s Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, and Tyco’s Dennis Kozlowski, while others are less familiar. The foundations involved have assets that range from a relatively paltry two hundred thousand dollars up to the billions held by the Ford Foundation. Including Ford’s assets, the foundations on this table control \$10.3 billion of wealth. Excluding Ford, the number shrinks to about \$1 billion.

1. These searches took place during January 2004.

The corporate crimes of these CEOs and COOs are difficult to compare and rank for their degree of disrepute, but Alternet.org recently publicized a “Ten Worse Corporations of 2003” list. Several of these individuals are also connected to foundations, as outlined in Table 2.

Table 1: Corporate Criminals on Foundation Boards

Board Member	Corporate Background	Claim to Infamy	Foundation	Foundation Assets
Paul A. Allaire	Chairman and CEO, Xerox Corporation	SEC charged that Allaire permitted/encouraged unacceptable accounting practices to raise reported earnings.	Trustee, board chair, Ford Foundation ²	\$9,345,030,447
			Trustee, Outward Bound (has public charity status)	\$21,384,718
Philip F. Anschutz	Founder, Qwest	NY AG Spitzer charged Anschutz and other telecom leaders with improperly benefiting from IPO's. Anschutz settled, paying \$4.4 million. Congressional investigators are also examining whether or not Anschutz had advance knowledge of the company's financial problems before he sold \$213 million in Qwest stock.	President, The Anschutz Collection	\$1,041
			Donor, chairman, the Anschutz Foundation	\$453,931,186
			Sole donor and chair, Random Acts of Kindness Foundation	\$380,813
Dean Buntrock	Founder, former chairman and former CEO, Waste Management, Incorporated	SEC charged Buntrock with leading efforts to use inappropriate accounting practices to reach target earnings.	Director, Terra Foundation for the Arts	\$406,887,088
			Donor and director, Dean L. & Rosemarie Buntrock Foundation	\$8,550,711
Andrew S. Fastow	Former CFO, Enron	SEC alleged that Fastow defrauded Enron's shareholders by inflating the value of the company's earnings. Without admitting or denying the allegations, Fastow agreed to jail time, O&D bar, and financial penalties.	Donor, president, treasurer, Fastow Family Foundation	\$4,178,084
Ken Lay	Former chairman, Enron	SEC is investigating Lay's alleged efforts to deliberately mislead investors about the company's fiscal health.	Vice President, Linda and Ken Lay Family	\$2,415,130
L. Dennis Kozlowski	Former chairman and CEO, Tyco	Under investigation for tax evasion, larceny, falsifying business records, and failing to disclose secret company loans.	Donor, trustee, Kozlowski Family Foundation	\$523,971

2. Prior to the release of this report on June 29, 2004, a Ford Foundation press release, dated May 28, 2004, announced the resignation of Paul Allaire as chair and member of its board. The press release can be found at: http://www.fordfound.org/news/view_news_detail.cfm?news_index=143.

Board Member	Corporate Background	Claim to Infamy	Foundation	Foundation Assets
Joseph P. Nacchio	Former CEO, Qwest	Nacchio agreed to pay \$400,000 to settle charges by Spitzer that he improperly profited from stock offerings underwritten by Citigroup.	Donor, president, treasurer, the Nacchio Foundation	\$429,753
Philip B. Rooney	Former CEO, president and director, Waste Management, Incorporated	SEC charged Rooney with participating in efforts to use inappropriate accounting practices to reach target earnings.	Donor, director, president, Rooney Family Foundation	\$24,939
Richard M. Scrusby	Founder and former CEO, HEALTHSOUTH	SEC charged that Scrusby systematically overstated HEALTHSOUTH's earnings by at least \$1.4 billion.	Donor, director, Richard M. Scrusby Charitable Foundation	\$12,708,322
Jeffrey K. Skilling	Former CEO, Enron	SEC charged Skilling with engaging in inappropriate financial practices to overstate earnings.	Donor, trustee, Jeffrey Keith Skilling Foundation	\$203,696
Mark Swartz	Former CFO, Tyco	Swartz is charged with tax evasion, grand larceny, falsifying business records, and failing to disclose secret company loans.	Donor, trustee, Swartz Family Foundation	\$978,725
Frank E. Walsh, Jr.	Former director, Tyco	SEC charged Walsh with knowingly signing a statement that contained false information concerning a merger. Walsh was promised a finder's fee by Kozlowski for the merger. This was not included in the paperwork concerning the merger and other parties who received finder's fees.	Donor, chairman, Sandy Hill Foundation	\$35,711,035
			President, Elsie E. & Joseph W. Beck Foundation	\$5,012,612
Gary Winnick	Former chairman, Global Crossing	In January 2002, Global Crossing filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The company was accused of employing misleading transactions and accounting methods. Winnick cashed in \$735 million of stock over four years. He testified in Congress that he did not know about the company's problems when he sold \$123 million in stock. Federal prosecutors have said they will not pursue criminal action against him. Without admitting or denying the allegations, he settled, accepting an O&D bar and a \$20 million restitution.	Donor, chairman, Winnick Family Foundation	\$36,475,455

Table 2: Foundations connected to leaders of AlterNet.org’s list of the “10 Worst Corporations of 2003.”

Company	Claim to Infamy	Leader	Foundation
Clear Channel	Clear Channel, the largest radio station owner in the U.S., specializes in consuming or eliminating locally owned radio stations and has a record of repeated law-breaking.	L. Lowry Mays Chairman and CEO	Mays Family Foundation (L. Lowry Mays is a donor and the treasurer; Mark Mays is a donor; Randall Mays is a donor and director)
		Mark P. Mays President, COO, and Director	
		Randall T. Mays EVP, CFO, and Director	
HealthSouth	Fifteen of its top execs have pled guilty in connection with a scheme to deceive investors of the company’s financial condition.	Joel C. Gordon Acting Chairman	Donor and president, Joel C. and Bernice W. Gordon Family Foundation
Merrill Lynch	Merrill Lynch recently received a \$100 million fine due to analysts making recommendations in bad faith. Three of its execs were indicted due to its dealings with Enron.	Stanley O’Neal Chairman, CEO, and President	Donor and president, O’Neal Foundation

We make no contention that this “baker’s dozen” plus five constitutes the entirety of corporate scofflaws engaged in private philanthropy, either their own or on the governing boards of independent foundations. But they represent the continuation of a dynamic of some of the less admirable players in the U.S. private market system, building or bolstering their good name and image through philanthropy—with nary a raised eyebrow from the philanthropic sector.

The Ford Foundation, Standing by Its Man

As *The New York Times* reported in July 2003, Ford decided to keep former Xerox CEO Paul Allaire as the chairperson of its board of directors, despite the Securities and Exchange Commission’s charges that he committed securities fraud, and aided and abetted “Xerox’s violations of the reporting, books and records and internal control provisions of the federal securities laws.”³

3. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission press release: “Six Former Senior Executives at Xerox Settle SEC Enforcement Action Charging Them with Fraud,” June 5, 2003.

Current laws and regulations do not require those who commit corporate fraud to be removed from private corporations—such as foundations.

In particular, the SEC accused Allaire and five other former Xerox executives of engaging in a fraudulent accounting scheme from 1997 to 2000 to mislead investors about Xerox's earnings, boosting the company's stock price and their annual compensation in the process. As part of the alleged scheme, Xerox used accounting devices that violated generally acceptable accounting principles (GAAP). The SEC claims that the scheme increased Xerox's reported pre-tax earnings by approximately \$1.4 billion between 1997 and 2000. The SEC claims that Allaire was not only aware of the use of inappropriate accounting devices but also encouraged their use by clearly creating a leadership culture that equated business success with meeting short-term earnings targets. The allegations suggest that Allaire was both encouraging the use of inappropriate means to an end (unacceptable accounting devices), and ignoring long-term consequences of the company's actions in favor of meeting and inflating short-term earnings targets.

Without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, Allaire agreed to a settlement that fined him \$1 million, mandated that he return nearly \$8 million that he earned due to Xerox's accounting methods, and barred him from serving as an officer or director at a public company. The Ford Foundation is a private foundation, so Allaire could continue to serve on the board.

When Allaire settled with the SEC, the Executive Committee of the Ford Foundation's board of directors met to decide whether Allaire should remain on the board. Although Allaire is a member of the Executive Committee, he apparently did not participate in these discussions, which resulted in a vote to retain him as the chairperson of the Ford Foundation's board of directors. Kathryn S. Fuller, President and CEO of the World Wildlife Fund and a member of the Ford Foundation's board Executive Committee, stated, "We were committed to doing what we considered and consider the right thing, and that is what is best for the foundation, which is to stay with a man who has been an exemplary leader." A statement from the full board stated, "As the terms of that settlement do not relate to Mr. Allaire's service with private organizations and having considered the matter carefully, the board strongly reaffirms his role as its chairman."⁴

Current laws and regulations do not require those who commit corporate fraud to be removed from private corporations—such as foundations. They generally only bar people from serving with publicly traded companies. When the potential for corporate fraud exists, the SEC investigates the matter and, if necessary, will seek (from a federal judge or SEC administrative law judge) an officer-and-director (O&D) bar for the person or persons in question. Bars are also agreed to as parts of settlements, in which an individual may agree to a settlement with no admission of guilt or the formal finding of facts related to the case.

4. Stephanie Strom, "Foundation to Keep Leader Accused of Fraud at Xerox." *The New York Times*. July 8, 2003.

Recent corporate scandals and their impact on the nation's economy and workforce have motivated the SEC to remove more corporate criminals from leadership positions at the nation's publicly traded companies. The recent increase in the number of O&D bars reflects this interest, as well as the impact of relatively new regulations that makes O&D bar rulings easier to obtain. In particular, under Sections 305 and 1105 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in the wake of the Enron scandal, the SEC can seek an O&D bar in administrative proceedings before the SEC's own administrative law judges. Previously, the SEC could only seek a bar in federal court, a process which requires full-fledged discovery, as opposed to an administrative proceeding, which is expedited and has very limited discovery. The Act also lowers the standard the SEC must meet for obtaining the bar from "substantially unfit" to "unfit." In 2000, there were 38 O&D bars; in 2001, 51; and in 2002 (the last year for which data are available), 126.⁵

Of the individuals listed in Table 1, SEC records indicate that the following are either temporarily or permanently barred or sought to be barred from serving as board members or officers of publicly traded companies:

- Paul A. Allaire (5 years)
- Dean L. Buntrock (term undisclosed/sought)
- Andrew S. Fastow (permanent)
- L. Dennis Kozlowski (permanent/sought)
- Phillip B. Rooney (term unknown/sought)
- Richard Scrushy (permanent/sought)
- Jeffrey K. Skilling (permanent/sought)
- Mark H. Swartz (permanent/sought)
- Frank E. Walsh (permanent)

By virtue of the comparative SEC actions, Allaire is hardly the worst of corporate leaders parading in front of the Commission, much less those whose fates are being decided by judges and juries.

Public Policy Options

As mentioned earlier in this report, recent foundation scandals have caught the attention of lawmakers, both at the state and national levels. As of this writing, both the House of Representatives and the Senate have discussed holding hearings on nonprofits and foundations, in part to help inform eventual legislation that would seek to provide better oversight of both types of organizations. Several states are

Considering that foundations have no shareholders who can exert pressure on executive and board leadership to behave legally and ethically, and that experts estimate that 45 percent of foundation assets can be considered public dollars—thanks to tax breaks related to establishing and operating a foundation—the government needs to have authority to protect and defend the public's interest.

5. Based on fiscal years that begin on October 1 and end on September 30.

also examining their current nonprofit and foundation oversight laws, with the apparent goal of increasing these organizations' levels of fiscal accountability.

For example, Elliot Spitzer, the New York State Attorney General, has proposed increasing state audits, promoting better transparency, and improving board governance of foundations and nonprofits. Spitzer at one time also discussed the possibility of proposing legislation that would require a minimum foundation asset size, in order to reduce the many small foundations currently operating in New York State with essentially no government oversight.

Currently, only the SEC possesses the power to seek O&D bars, and—once again—only has authority to bar people from serving as leaders of publicly traded companies. Considering that foundations have no shareholders who can exert pressure on executive and board leadership to behave legally and ethically, and that experts estimate that 45 percent of foundation assets can be considered public dollars—thanks to tax breaks related to establishing and operating a foundation—the government needs to have authority to protect and defend the public's interest. Quite simply, coverage of O&D bars needs to be expanded to include the nonprofit and foundation sectors. It is logical to believe that if someone is barred from serving as an officer or director of a publicly traded corporation, then he or she should also be barred from serving as an officer or director of a private foundation or other nonprofit organization.

Options for expanding O&D bars to include foundations and nonprofit organizations include the following:

- Expand SEC O&D rulings to foundations and nonprofit organizations, effectively expanding the mandate of the SEC outside of publicly traded companies;
- Empower a current agency (aside from the SEC) to seek and issue O&D bars in the foundation and nonprofit sectors; or
- Create a standard that strongly encourages and recommends—but does not require—foundations and nonprofit organizations to bar individuals who have received an SEC O&D bar from serving as officers, directors, or trustees.

Public Policy and Philanthropic Accountability Recommendations

The SEC currently has no jurisdiction over private foundations and nonprofit organizations, which would make the first option difficult to implement. And based on the tendency of foundation leaders to defend and protect their colleagues when they face some sort of public scrutiny—Kathryn Fuller’s quote, above, regarding Allaire’s service at the Ford Foundation is a good example—and the failure of the foundation sector to police itself in recent years, the third option above is not feasible.

Considering that the Internal Revenue Service is currently charged with regulating foundations and nonprofit organizations, the second option appears to be the most logical to legislate and implement. Legislation could be proposed that simply mandated that whenever an individual receives an O&D bar from the SEC, then he or she is also barred from serving as an officer, director, or trustee of a foundation or nonprofit organization. The SEC would be required to notify the IRS that an individual has received an O&D bar, and then the IRS would conduct a search to see if that individual is on the board of a registered foundation or nonprofit organization. If he or she is, then the IRS notifies the individual (and other executives, directors, and trustees of the foundation or nonprofit organization) that he or she must cease involvement with the foundation or organization within a predetermined period of time. A follow-up audit would check to ensure that the individual has in fact ceased involvement with the foundation or nonprofit organization.

Putting some foundation-related muscle into SEC actions is not a panacea. This is one of the increasingly frequent “bad apple” situations that organized philanthropy ought to be able to address before the SEC or a federal district court comes into play. As of this writing, for example, more than two years after the implosion of Enron, Ken Lay has yet to be formally charged. When the Heinz Trust retained him on the board of a Heinz affiliate, the official explanation was that his misdeeds at Enron did not prevent him from delivering social value through his role on the Heinz environmental center’s board.

There are obviously examples of people who have come out of substantial punishment to deliver philanthropic value, the once-jailed junk-bond dealer, Michael Milken being a case in point. But, unlike the unindicted Ken Lay or the unconvicted Dennis Koslowski, Milken served his time, 22 months in fact, emerging from prison in 1993 to create the Milken Foundation, a moderately conservative economic think tank, and funneling his personal charitable giving to education (the Milken National Educator Awards) and health causes, the latter focused on the prostate

cancer that he suffers. With Rebuild LA's Peter Uebertoth and Sega CEO Thomas Kalinske on the Milken Family Foundation Board, it would appear that the 1980s' Gordon Gekko has been exonerated and rehabilitated from junk bond scoundrel to noble philanthropist. Some skeptics haven't been fully convinced that there isn't yet another speculative scheme lurking behind Milken's post-prison good works.

Take Kozlowski's philanthropy and its social value. Tyco's own complaint against the former CEO includes Kozlowski's corporate philanthropic donation of \$1.3 million to the Nantucket Conservation Foundation to purchase undeveloped property adjacent to Kozlowski's \$5 million home. The benefit to Kozlowski? Nothing would ever be built next to his estate. The corporation had a knack for supporting charities of particular personal benefit to him, including \$4 million to the Metropolitan Museum of Art, which of course placed him on its board (along with Global Crossing's Gary Winnick for his \$5 million), and his \$10 million to the California International Sailing Association (Tyco's complaint against Kozlowski includes his charging the corporation for over \$100,000 in expenses for his use of a Tyco-owned 130 foot yacht). Tyco's complaint alleged that \$46 million of Tyco's \$106 million in corporate charity between 1997 and 2002 was "donations...made for (Kozlowski's) personal benefit or were represented as his personal donations."

His own personal foundation can hardly be used as a paragon of playing by the rules. With assets of \$534,473 at the end of 2000, the Dennis Kozlowski Family Foundation made only one donation that year for \$3,000. The one grant recipient, Shackleton Schools, expressed its appreciation with the totality of the foundation's grants payout by naming Kozlowski's daughter to its board. The Tyco complaint alleged that Kozlowski funneled \$1 million in Tyco charitable giving to the school, which might explain the nonprofit's over-the-top gratitude. With smaller assets, the Kozlowski Foundation disbursed no grants in 1998 and only one grant in 1999 (\$265 to the Tolstoy Foundation).

There's no limit to the irony of the charitable giving patterns of these paragons of corporate misbehavior. Lay and Kozlowski are both known for endowing eponymous chairs at universities, usually dedicated to teaching corporate governance. The national organization that educates young people about business, Junior Achievement, reportedly got \$130,000 from Global Crossing and Winnick, \$10,000 from Tyco and Kozlowski, and, for JA's Houston chapter, \$86,000 from the Jeffrey Skilling Foundation, though the chapter's records show only \$2,000 from the Enron exec.

The foundation sector will know about these less than salutary philanthropic behaviors long before anything ever reaches the SEC, much less the courts, for action. If the sector purports to believe in ethics, it has to stand up for them—and to speak out loudly against the misuse of philanthropy by corporate criminals. The Clinton pardon of corporate fugitives Marc Rich and his business partner, Pincus Green, constitute a case in point.

Rich and Green skipped the country in 1983 when hit with a 65-count indictment, with potential prison sentences of 325 years, including criminal charges for ducking \$48 million in taxes and for trading oil illegally with Iran while the Ayatollah Khomeini held American hostages. Both fled to Switzerland and evaded extradition for 17 years. President Clinton cited the extensive philanthropic activity of Rich during his comfortable years in Switzerland, and Rich secured testimonials of his philanthropy from people as diverse as Israel's prime ministers Ehud Barak and Shimon Peres, Mossad's Shabtai Shavit, and the king of Spain. (Individually and through the Marc Rich Foundation, Rich apparently has given some \$80 million to hospitals and museums in Israel; the lower profile Pinky Green was listed as president of the Darchey Noam Stiftung, a foundation in Switzerland).

While Clinton was probably more moved by Denise Rich's political donation of more than \$1,000,000 to the Democratic Party and \$100,000 to Hillary Clinton's senatorial campaign and perhaps the importance of Jewish support for the Senate campaign as well, foundations and nonprofits could have and should have stood up to denounce the "philanthropic good works" justification—one of eight used by Clinton—for the pardons, which Rich's prosecutors termed a "travesty."

While extending SEC rules and strengthening IRS oversight might deal with some of these philanthropic aberrations, the foundation sector cannot and should not wait for government regulations before it cleans up its own house—and sometimes government regulations may well be the wrong way to go. Lauding the philanthropy of corporate scofflaws, using Tyco-style philanthropy to burnish the image of unsavory corporate leaders, or hiding behind philanthropic good works to earn presidential pardons, these are all practices that the foundation sector ought to speak out against. Some money clothed in charitable wrappings simply is not worth the cost of chipping away at philanthropic probity and accountability.

Conclusion

Unlike for-profit companies, there is no body of shareholders to provide oversight of a foundation. Similarly, the public does not get a chance to vote foundation leaders out of office. Consequently, the government has an obligation to make sure that foundations are using and managing their resources effectively and legally. Expanding O&D bars to the foundation and nonprofit sectors is one way for the government to do just that. But the major responsibility lies with the foundation sector itself to steer clear of felonious philanthropists and to boot them out of the philanthropic fraternity or sorority whenever they sneak through the door.

Foundations often tap individuals from the for-profit sector for board service, citing their specialized skills and abilities as a reason for doing so. Since an individual's skills and abilities can be so easily transferred from a for-profit corporation to a private foundation, it is easy to assume—and fear—that their illegal and unethical behavior can be transferred as well.

HELP IMPROVE PHILANTHROPY FOR ALL – JOIN NCRP TODAY!

Join NCRP now to help advocate for philanthropic policies and practices that are more relevant to critical public needs. As a member you will receive the following benefits:

- Four issues of NCRP's quarterly, *Responsive Philanthropy*.** Find news and perspectives you won't get anywhere else. We dig deeper into stories glossed over in the mainstream and say the things that no one else will say.
- The *NCRP Bulletin*.** NCRP periodically offers insightful commentary on news from major media outlets, the philanthropy press, and the alternative press – and highlights the stories you may have missed.
- Publication discounts.** Members receive discounts on NCRP's groundbreaking reports, including *Are We Ready? Social Change Philanthropy and the \$10 Trillion Transfer of Wealth*, *\$1 Billion for Ideas: Conservative Think Tanks in the 1990s* (1999), *The State of Philanthropy 2002*, *Giving at Work 2003* and *Advocacy for Social Change in Metropolitan Washington* (2003).
- E-mail news releases and action alerts.** Receive news releases and action alerts on the critical issues that you care about in philanthropy. When you sign up to be a member, just make sure to include your e-mail address on this form and we'll make sure to deliver timely information directly to you online.
- And, most importantly, a voice.** Should philanthropic institutions be more open and accountable to people of color, the poor, women, and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender Americans? Should philanthropy nurture innovative solutions to the root causes of societal problems and advocate for social change? Should philanthropic institutions monitor institutions of power? We think so. If you agree, we ask you to strengthen NCRP as your commonsense voice for social justice in the philanthropic community.

Yes, I want to join NCRP in making philanthropy more accessible to the disadvantaged and more accountable to all! I am applying to become an:

ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBER (voting)
(suggested amounts based on organizational budget)

- Up to \$50,000 = **\$50**
 \$50,000 to \$100,000 = **\$100**
 \$100,000 to \$500,000 = **\$175**
 \$500,000 to \$1 million = **\$250**
 \$1 million to \$5 million = **\$500**
 Over \$5 million = **\$1,200**
 Other = _____

INDIVIDUAL MEMBER (non-voting)
(suggested amounts based on annual income)

- Up to \$25,000 = **\$25**
 \$25,000 to \$35,000 = **\$35**
 \$35,000 to \$50,000 = **\$50**
 \$50,000 to \$75,000 = **\$100**
 \$75,000 to \$200,000 = **\$250**
 Over \$200,000 = **\$500**
 Other = _____

Please PRINT:

Please check ONE

Name Miss Mrs. Ms. Mr.

Title _____ Organization _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip Code _____

E-mail _____

Phone _____ Fax _____

Credit VISA MasterCard Number: _____ Expiration Date: _____

NCRP is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, so all contributions are tax deductible to the extent that they exceed the fair market value of any goods or services you receive in return. To join NCRP by mail, please complete this form and mail it with your check or money order to: NCRP, 2001 S Street, NW, Suite 620, Washington, DC 20009. For more information visit us online at www.ncrp.org call NCRP at (202) 387-9177 or fax (202) 332-5084.

Serving Time...on Foundation Boards

© 2004 National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy



national committee for
responsive philanthropy

For information or copies of this report, please contact NCRP:

2001 S Street NW, Suite 620 • Washington, DC 20009

Phone 202.387.9177 • Fax 202.332.5084

E-mail: info@ncrp.org • Web: www.ncrp.org